Introduction
Governments levy excise taxes on cigarettes for two reasons: to raise revenues and to discourage smoking. Before the surgeon general's 1964 report on the ills of smoking,1 these taxes were justified nprmarily in terms of raising revenue.
After the report, however, some form of regulation was needed to battle the newfound public health hazard. Although many other forms of regulation were attempted, excise taxes became an integral part of this new regulation.2 Discussions about tobacco taxes now typically focus on reducing tobacco consumption and improving public health.3
The logic of tobacco taxes is taken directly from economic theory. Since a rise in the tax rate increases the cost of cigarettes, the law of supply and demand suggests that fewer cigarettes will be consumed if taxes on them are raised. Kaiserman and Rogers, for example, report that since the early 1980s, tobacco consumption has been falling faster in Canada than in the United States as a result of Canada's higher tax rates.4 Perkurinen of discouraging the consumption of tobacco rather than the specific influence of warning labels per se. The second is the dummy variable multiplied by the overall change-in-taxes variable. The third is our bootlegging measure. This equation will tell us several things. First, the tax slope can now be interpreted as the impact on consumption of tax increases before the warning labels on packages. Second, the coefficient for the multiplied variable will tell us how much the impact of taxes changed after the report. Third, we will get direct estimates of the impact of the warning labels and bootlegging on consumption. The results are in Table 3 . ging also mattered. State "consumption" decreased by 0.106 packs per capita for every 1 cent that a state's tax was above the mean of bordering states. This change in the impact of taxes after the health warnings is also probably linked to one other factor-the decline in the number of smokers. In 1965, 46.1% of adults smoked; in 1992, this percentage had dropped to 26.7%.25 Our dependent variable, by necessity, is consumption per capita, not per smoker. To illustrate, in the 1960s, a 1-cent real increase in taxes reduced consumption by 0.774 packs per capita or 1.68 packs per smoker. In 1992, with only 26.7% smokers, a per-smoker reduction of 1.68 packs translates into only 0.45 packs per capita. In short, even if the relationship for smokers remained the same, the relationship for the entire population would have declined.
The relative impact of federal versus state taxes, therefore, can be explained by the phenomenon of bootlegging and the size of the federal tax increases. Even after several decades of efforts to discourage smoking, federal taxes remain a highly effective tool in reducing cigarette consumption.
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In a commentary on Peterson et are much more effective in reducing smoking. We also found evidence that the public health concerns of the 1960s had a significant impact on cigarette consumption. Finally, we discovered that health warnings combine with excise taxes in an interesting way. With the existence of health warnings, individuals have reasons other than economic ones to stop smoking. As a result, the impact of a 1-cent increase in taxes is actually less after the adoption of the health warnings than it had been before.
These findings have implications for public health policy. Excise tax increases are clearly one policy weapon that is effective in reducing the consumption of tobacco. Given the smaller pool of smokers, however, larger tax increases are necessary to get the same reduction in smoking. This suggests that the large state tax increases of the 1990s, as illustrated by Michigan's 1994 increase of 50 cents per pack, may have a substantial effect on the demand for cigarettes. Because high state taxes can be partially circumvented by bootlegging, however, increases in the federal excise tax will remain more effective than state tax increases. 3
